Judicial Power and the Charter: Reflections on the Activism Debate by Manfredi, Christopher
JUDICIAL POWER AND THE CHARTER: 
REFLECTIONS ON THE ACTIVISM DEBATE
Christopher P. Manfredi*
Most legal commentators place my writing squarely within the camp of conservative, or even 
“right-wing,” critics of judicial activism.1 The principal reason for this characterization is my 
book Judicial Power and the Charter, published in its second edition in 2001.2 Although these 
commentators have recognized some merits in my argument, I have been criticized for, among 
other things, failing to define judicial activism, concealing my preference for legislative 
supremacy behind the rhetoric of constitutional supremacy, and inconsistency in not criticizing 
the Supreme Court for failing to act when it should have. At the core of many of the 
disagreements between me and my critics is whether judicial activism is capable of neutral 
definition without simply being a “code word” for decisions with which the commentator 
disagrees. In my contribution to this Forum, I wish to address some of the issues surrounding this 
debate.
For a book that is considered an integral contribution to the judicial activism debate, it is 
worth noting that the term “judicial activism” only appears seven times in Judicial Power and 
the Charter. Indeed, there is a reason why the book is entitled Judicial Power and the Charter, 
rather than Judicial Activism and the Charter. My concern in writing the book was two-fold. 
First, I wanted to investigate how the Charter had affected the nature of judicial power. Not 
surprisingly, I argued that the power of courts has increased. Although the Supreme Court of 
Canada, like all final courts of appeal, has always been a policy-making institution, the Charter 
obviously expands the range of social and political issues subject to its jurisdiction. Second, I 
wanted to understand and explain how the Court’s use of its C/iarter-enhanced power had 
affected the development of public policy in several key areas. This explains, but perhaps does
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not folly justify, the decision to focus primarily on cases in which the Court had altered public 
policy.
There was a further motivation for writing the book, the first edition of which appeared in 
1993. In December 1988, four months after I began my academic career at McGill University, 
the Supreme Court struck down important provisions of Québec’s Bill 101. Québec responded 
with Bill 178, which it immunized from judicial review by invoking the notwithstanding clause 
of section 33 of the Charter. The reaction was swift and negative, with a general consensus 
emerging that section 33 was at best inconsistent with the idea of constitutionally entrenched 
rights, and at worst a constitutional abomination. Most famously, Prime Minister Brian 
Mulroney called section 33 "that major fatal flaw of 1981, which reduces your individual rights 
and mine." Section 33, Mulroney continued, "holds rights hostage" and renders the entire 
constitution suspect. Any constitution, he concluded, "that does not protect the inalienable and 
imprescriptible individual rights of individual Canadians is not worth the paper it is written on."3
I decided to write a book which argued that section 33 was, in fact, a positive 
contribution to constitutionalism in Canada. I argued that the growing opposition to the 
notwithstanding clause was the product of an historical accident and three conceptual errors. The 
historical accident was that Canadians experienced a use of section 33 that they found 
objectionable before the Supreme Court rendered a politically unpopular Charter decision. One 
conceptual error involved a misunderstanding of the constitutional role of legislatures and courts 
in liberal constitutional theory. There is nothing in that theory which assigns the task of 
constitutional interpretation exclusively to courts: legislatures also have a legitimate and 
important role to play. A second conceptual error stemmed from a basic misunderstanding of the 
legislative process as being characterized by the haphazard adoption of measures motivated by 
majority tyranny. To be sure, legislatures can act both irrationally and arbitrarily; and judicial 
review provides an important check on these pathologies of legislative behaviour. Nevertheless, 
judicial supremacy may be a cure worse than the disease, since courts suffer from their own 
institutional pathologies when it comes to evaluating complex policy choices. The final
3 House of Commons Debates, (6 April 1989) at 153 (Brian Mulroney).
conceptual error was a basic misunderstanding of the nature of Charter adjudication. Although 
Charter cases raise fundamental questions about rights or moral principles, the dispute in most 
cases is about whether the legislature has chosen the least restrictive means of achieving an 
important policy objective. Yet, even if Charter cases did involve serious disputes about 
fundamental moral principles on a regular basis, there would be no reason to leave the resolution 
of those disputes in the exclusive hands of Supreme Court justices.
I suggested instead that “section 33 can have a positive impact by encouraging a more 
politically vital discourse on the meaning of rights and their relationship to competing 
constitutional visions than what emanates from the judicial monologue that results from a regime 
of judicial supremacy.”4 I also suggested ways in which section 33 could be amended to enhance 
its post-Bill 178 legitimacy. Although other scholars took up the discourse or dialogue theme5 
(for which I claim no direct influence), I became increasingly pessimistic that section 33 was 
having, or would have, this effect. Thus, I wrote a second edition of Judicial Power and the 
Charter in order to update both its review of the Court’s impact on public policy and to 
understand why legislatures had lost most, if not all, of their authority to define rights, as 
opposed to simply re-evaluating “the balance struck by the courts between constitutional rights 
and other interests.”6 For there can be no doubt that the Supreme Court has secured exclusive 
authority to determine the content of rights. The very idea that section 33 involves legislatures’ 
overriding rights is evidence of this authority.
I
Much of the debate about judicial activism concerns the very meaning of the term. Sujit 
Choudhry notes that it is “slippery” and “variously means the departure from well-established 
precedent, adjudication based on judicial preferences, and/or the judicial reallocation of 
institutional roles between the courts and other branches of government.”7 Kent Roach argues
4 Christopher P. Manfredi, Judicial Power and the Charter (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1993) at 207-08.
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that it has at least four dimensions: judges making law, judges being eager to make and impose 
the law, judges using rights to trump other values, and judges having the last word.8 In my view, 
judicial activism is not that difficult a concept either to define or to identify. At its core, judicial 
activism is the willingness of courts to reverse or otherwise alter the policy decisions of 
legislatures and executives. A court that never did this would be entirely deferential; a court that 
always did it would be completely activist. In the real world, of course, no court’s behaviour 
reflects either of these extremes. In practice, this means that every court is at least somewhat 
activist. Although reasonable people may disagree whether any particular court has been too 
activist or exercised its activism outside the parameters of its constitutional authority, it is 
possible to compare levels of activism across both time and space. Thus, one can compare the 
levels of activism in two different courts or on the same court at different periods of time.
By any measure, therefore, the Supreme Court of Canada has been more activist in the 
post-Charter era than during any period of its history since becoming Canada’s final court of 
appeal in 1949.9 From 1982 to 2002, the Court decided 436 Charter cases (about 21 per year).10 
In 152 of those cases (about 35 percent), the Court upheld the Charter claim. As a result, the 
Court nullified 75 federal and provincial statutes, for a rate of 3.6 nullifications per year. 
Contrast this with the Court’s activity under the 1960 Bill of Rights. From 1960 to 1982, it 
decided 34 Bill of Rights cases (about 1.5 per year).11 It upheld the claim on only five occasions 
(14.7 percent), resulting in the nullification of only one statute. The Charter Court is more 
activist even if one takes as the point of comparison constitutional cases under its federalism 
jurisdiction.12 From 1950 to 1984, it decided 177 division of powers cases (about five per year),
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and it nullified 65 federal and provincial statutes (less than two per year). More recent federalism 
data are consistent with this trend: from 2000 to 2002 the Court decided eleven division of 
powers cases (less than four per year) and nullified only one statute on federalism grounds.
The Court’s posX-Charter activism should not come as a surprise: it is an inevitable and 
intentional product of the Charter's design. Indeed, to criticize judicial activism per se would be 
to deny the possibility that legislatures and executives may act in ways that exceed their 
constitutional authority. Such a denial, however, would be completely inconsistent with the 
theory of liberal constitutionalism, which is premised on the very notion that checks and 
balances are necessary to keep political power within constitutional boundaries. Indeed, the 
purpose of this form of political organization is to protect largely individual rights, including the 
right to self-government, by limiting political power. These limitations are both procedural—in 
the sense that they dictate how political power can be exercised—and substantive—in the sense 
that they prohibit specific uses of political power. The power of judicial review is, therefore, an 
indispensable and key element of liberal constitutionalism. There is no doubt that section 52(1) 
of the Constitution Act, 1982 and section 24(1) of the Charter explicitly establish a political 
regime of constitutional supremacy in which limits on political power are enforced through 
constitutional judicial review of statutes, regulations, and official conduct.
However, the fact that final courts of appeal are political institutions creates a paradox in 
modem liberal constitutionalism. Courts make policy not as an accidental byproduct of 
performing their legal functions, but because their individual members believe that certain rules 
will be socially beneficial. For almost sixty years the dominant political science paradigm for 
explaining individual decision making in these courts has rested on two assumptions.13 The first 
is that judges, like other political actors, are goal-oriented and seek to advance their goals 
through legal judgments; the second is that judicial goals include policy preferences shaped by 
the personal background and experiences of individual judges. By way of example, every justice 
has his or her own understanding of what a properly functioning criminal justice system looks 
like. Justices evaluate the rules and practices that present themselves for review in individual
13 Jeffrey A. Segal & Harold J. Spaeth, The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1993).
cases according to this understanding. Where there is no conflict, there is no need to intervene; 
but where there is a conflict, individual justices must decide how and to what extent the existing 
rules or practices need to be altered.
The paradox of liberal constitutionalism lies in this: if judicial review evolves such that 
political power in its judicial form is limited only by a constitution whose meaning courts alone 
define, then judicial power is no longer itself constrained by constitutional limits. The framers of 
the Charter recognized this possibility and sought to counter it by providing legislatures with 
some control over judicial power through sections 1 and 33. Section 1 recognizes that no society 
can function properly if constitutionally guaranteed rights are absolute. Section 33, by contrast, 
recognizes that courts can make mistakes when defining and applying rights. Much of the recent 
debate in Canada about judicial activism and restraint has concerned the effectiveness of these 
two provisions in establishing an inter-institutional “dialogue” about rights and public policy 
between courts and legislatures. This debate has occurred among both scholars and justices of 
the Supreme Court.
II
According to dialogue theorists, sections 1 and 33 provide significant opportunities for 
legislatures to modify or reverse rights-based judicial decisions. In modifying a Charter decision, 
legislatures accept a decision’s fondamental constitutional holding but reject all or part of the 
decision’s section 1 analysis with respect to reasonable limitations. Legislative reversal, or 
legislative rejection of a decision’s fundamental constitutional holding that there is a conflict 
between the impugned action and the Charter, is the most aggressive response to judicial 
nullification. Where the Court has nullified an existing statute, the sole legitimate means of 
reversal is the section 33 override, although one can argue whether this is necessary where the 
conflict involves existing or new common law rules.14
14 Roach would argue that section 33 is necessary in these cases as well. I would argue that simple legislation is 
sufficient. Indeed, to legislate and invoke section 33 where no statute existed before would pre-empt judicial review 
of the new statute and undermine any opportunity for dialogue. As I have argued elsewhere, when used 
preemptively, section 33 does become an instrument of legislative supremacy.
The theoretical and practical robustness of sections 1 and 33 as constitutional limitations 
on judicial power is questionable. Two developments—one legal and the other political—have 
limited the effectiveness of these two provisions. The legal development concerns the Court’s 
development of its section 1 jurisprudence. In R. v. Oakes (1986), Chief Justice Dickson 
suggested that Charter limitations should be measured against the "values and principles 
essential to a free and democratic society," which include "respect for the inherent dignity of the 
human person, commitment to social justice and equality, accommodation of a wide variety of 
beliefs, respect for cultural and group identity, and faith in social and political institutions which 
enhance the participation of individuals and groups in society."15 The obvious difficulty is that 
these “values and principles” are both indeterminate and often internally irreconcilable. For 
example, reasonable people can disagree about the practical consequences of respecting the 
inherent dignity of the human person, just as this value can conflict with respect for cultural and 
group identity. The result is that “free and democratic society” licenses judicial discretion rather 
than constraining it.
The same can be said about the Court’s definition of “reasonable limits.” The so-called 
Oakes test contains two elements. First, a government seeking to defend a limit on rights must 
show that its legislative objective relates "to concerns which are pressing and substantial in a 
free and democratic society"16 (emphasis added). Second, the limit itself must be proportionate to 
the legislative objective, which courts determine according to a three-pronged proportionality 
test. To pass the first prong of this test, the limit must be rationally connected to the legislative 
objective. Next, the government must show that, by impairing the relevant right or freedom as 
little as possible, the limit in question represents the least restrictive means of achieving this 
objective. Finally, it must be clear that the collective benefits of the limit outweigh its costs to 
the individual.
Although the Oakes test provides the basic framework for section 1 analysis, the Court 
has held that this framework’s application should vary according to both the type of public 
policy and its intended beneficiaries. In 1989, the Court drew an explicit distinction between
t5R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103, at 136 [Oakes].
16 Ibid. at 138-39.
policies where legislatures are mediating the claims of competing groups and those where 
government “is best characterized as the singular antagonist of the individual.”17 For policies of 
the first type, Chief Justice Brian Dickson suggested, the Court should be circumspect in 
assessing legislative objectives and means. By contrast, the second type of policy frees the Court 
to exercise its review function more aggressively. However, the Court has been inconsistent in 
following the implications of its apparently general rule of judicial deference in socio-economic 
policy cases. To cite just one example, in RJR Macdonald v. A.-G. Canada (1995), where a 
majority nullified restrictions on tobacco advertising, the Court stated that “[t]o carry judicial 
deference to the point of accepting Parliament’s view simply on the basis that the problem is 
serious and the solution difficult, would be to diminish the role of the courts in the constitutional 
process and to weaken the structure of rights upon which our constitution and our nation is 
founded.”18 In sum, the Court is unwilling to follow even self-imposed limits on its judicial 
review function, and its control over the interpretation and application of section 1 allows it to 
expand and contract those limits to suit its immediate policy objectives.
As a result, the potential range of legislative responses under section 1 is extremely 
limited. Rather than encourage a dialogue between equals, section 1 elevates judicial policy 
preferences to the status of constitutional principle. Consequently, legislatures are placed on the 
defensive in formulating any response to judicial nullification. A rational legislature, interested 
in maximizing the likelihood that its legislative sequel will be found constitutional, will choose a 
policy alternative that deviates minimally (if at all) from the Court’s preferred position. Of 
course, the legislative override in section 33 permits legislatures to reject the Court’s position 
outright, but political developments have made that option increasingly difficult to implement.
Section 33 was the product of hard political bargaining and compromise. When the First 
Ministers met on November 2, 1981 for a final round of constitutional negotiations, eight 
provinces still opposed the federal government's patriation plan. During the course of those 
negotiations, Saskatchewan premier Allan Blakeney argued forcefully for a legislative override 
provision that would apply to everything in the Charter except language rights, democratic rights
11 A.-G. Quebec v. Irwin Toy, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927at 994.
18 RJR Macdonald v. A.-G. Canada, [1995] 3 S.C.R. 199 at para. 136.
and fundamental freedoms.19 This proposal attracted the attention of other dissentient provinces, 
and they also pushed for the extension of the override provision to include fundamental 
freedoms. Sensing the opportunity for agreement, Prime Minister Trudeau indicated his 
willingness to accept this proposal subject to the premiers agreeing to a five-year time limit on 
any specific override clause. In what Roy Romanow and two other participants would describe 
as a "classic example of raw bargaining," the federal government and nine provincial 
governments agreed to this provision without which the negotiations might have failed.20
The circumstances that produced section 33 inhibited the public development of a 
coherent theoretical justification for the legislative override. The most extensive public 
discussion of this provision occurred on November 20, 1981 when then Justice Minister Jean 
Chrétien introduced the constitutional resolution containing the Charter into the House of 
Commons. Even then, Chrétien's remarks on section 33 covered only eleven paragraphs and 
were aimed primarily at assuring the House that it did not "emasculate" the Charter. The only 
theoretical point that Chrétien stressed in these remarks was that section 33 would be an 
infrequently used "safety valve" which would ensure "that legislatures rather than judges have 
the final say on important matters of public policy." Section 33, Chrétien argued, would allow 
legislatures "to correct absurd situations without going through the difficulty of obtaining 
constitutional amendments..."21
Contrary to Chrétien's explanation of the circumstances that might lead to the use of 
section 33, the first government to invoke the notwithstanding clause did so with quite different 
purposes in mind. On June 23, 1982 the Québec National Assembly passed legislation (Bill 62) 
amending all existing Québec statutes to include a notwithstanding clause. The Québec 
government thus used section 33 to make a pre-emptive strike against an agreement to which it 
had refused to give its assent.
19 The details of these negotiations are set out in Roy Romanow, John Whyte and Howard Leeson, Canada 
Notwithstanding: The Making of the Constitution, 1976-1982 (Toronto: Carswell/Methuen, 1984) at 193-215.
20 Ibid. at 211.
21 House of Commons Debates, (20 November 1981) at 13042-43 (Jean Chrétien).
Despite this unexpected use of section 33, most observers still considered it a viable part 
of the constitution. Nowhere is this more evident than in the Supreme Court’s January, 1988 
abortion decision.22 The political context of the decision meant that there was at least the 
possibility that the Progressive Conservative government of the day could find public support to 
override a judicial declaration of a constitutional right to abortion. This possibility presented the 
Court with a strategic dilemma. On the one hand, maintaining its Charter-based institutional 
authority to participate in controversial policy debates meant that the Court could not simply 
avoid the abortion issue, as it had in 1976. On the other hand, faced with uncertainty about 
whether judicial nullification of the federal abortion policy would trigger a legislative override, 
the justices confronted the possibility that the Court might “lose” its first direct confrontation 
with Parliament over a highly visible policy issue. In the long-term, this outcome could have 
seriously undermined any future claims the Court might make to constitutional supremacy.
Chief Justice Dickson’s solution to the dilemma was to nullify the existing law while 
maximizing the set of alternatives to legislative override. He did this by discovering 
administrative flaws in the operation of the abortion law while making it quite clear that it was 
“neither necessary nor wise” to “explore the broadest implications” of liberty in analyzing the 
abortion provisions.23 One plausible explanation for this cautious approach was the viability of 
section 33. That viability would suffer a significant blow less than one year after the abortion 
decision, when Québec Premier Robert Bourassa invoked section 33 in the midst of a language 
rights dispute, costing him three members of his cabinet and leveling a fatal blow against 
ratification of the Meech Lake Accord.
This sequence of events severely undermined the political legitimacy of section 33, and 
no government has used it in major legislation since. Indeed, in March 1998 the Alberta 
government learned a very hard lesson about the politics of section 33. On March 10, Alberta 
introduced a bill to compensate victims of provincial eugenic sterilization laws that were in 
effect from 1929 to 1972. One element of the bill was a provision to prohibit victims from suing 
for additional compensation, and the government proposed to shield that provision from judicial
22 Morgentaler, Smoling and Scott v. The Queen, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30.
23 Ibid. at 51.
review through the notwithstanding clause. In purely legal terms there was nothing particularly 
unusual about this provision. For example, provincial workers’ compensation and no-fault 
automobile insurance regimes also prohibit individual lawsuits as a quid pro quo for a simplified 
system of guaranteed compensation. On an emotional level, however, wielding the 
notwithstanding clause against this vulnerable group smacked of mean-spiritedness. As a result, 
one day after introducing the bill, the provincial attorney general withdrew it under intense 
political pressure. Alberta’s premier Ralph Klein explained the decision to withdraw the bill in 
the following terms: “It became abundantly clear that to individuals in this country the Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms is paramount and the use of any tool... to undermine [it] is something that 
should be used only in very, very rare circumstances.”24 It thus came as no surprise that the 
Alberta government summarily dismissed the idea of invoking the notwithstanding clause after 
the Supreme Court’s decision one month later in Vriend25 that its Human Rights Act must be read 
as providing protection on the basis of sexual orientation.
The recent debate over same-sex marriage appeared for a time to revive interest in section 
33. For example, in March 2000, a private member’s bill—the Marriage Amendment Act— 
passed in Alberta that defined marriage exclusively as an opposite sex union and contained a 
notwithstanding clause to protect that definition from Charter review. Although probably 
unconstitutional on federalism grounds, the bill indicated the possibility that a social innovation 
as fundamental as changing the legal definition of marriage might provoke sufficient political 
resistance to revitalize the legislative override. Ironically, it was precisely this possibility that 
may have made the notwithstanding clause even more difficult to invoke.
On September 16, 2003, the federal Opposition introduced a motion in Parliament “to 
reaffirm that marriage is and should remain the union of one man and one woman to the 
exclusion of all others, and that Parliament take all necessary steps within the jurisdiction of the 
Parliament of Canada to preserve this definition of marriage in Canada.”26 The motion presented 
members of the governing Liberal party with a dilemma: most of them had supported an almost
24 Allyson Jeffs “About Face: Massive outcry forces Klein to back down on controversial move to limit sterilization 
settlements” Edmonton Journal (12 March 1998) A1.
25 Vriend v. Alberta, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 493.
26 House of Commons Debates, (16 September 2003) at 7379 (Stephen Harper).
identical motion in 1999, but the government’s new policy was that the definition of marriage 
should be changed to include same-sex unions. The Prime Minister suggested that those 
members could vote differently in 2003 in good conscience because a vote for the motion would 
be a vote against the Charter o f Rights and Freedoms. Why? Because “all necessary steps” might 
include invoking the notwithstanding clause, and to invoke the notwithstanding clause would 
undermine the Charter. The Prime Minister’s gambit worked: by the narrowest of margins (the 
Speaker casting the tie-breaking vote against it) the House of Commons rejected an amendment 
to remove the reference to “all necessary steps,” leading to the rejection of the main motion by a 
vote of 137-132. The successful transformation of a motion about the definition of marriage into 
a de facto referendum on the notwithstanding clause affirms earlier perceptions of a growing 
constitutional convention that it should never be invoked by any legislative body.27
To base a theory of dialogic constitutionalism on the mere existence of section 33 is thus 
an overly simplistic, ahistorical and apolitical type of legal formalism. Of course legislatures 
could reverse by override, but the advocates of judicial power—if not of supremacy—have 
altered the political context to put the presumptive advantage in debates about rights squarely in 
the hands of the Supreme Court. Indeed, the very idea that section 33 involves legislatures’ 
overriding rights enhances the judicial advantage. Under these circumstances there cannot be 
inter-institutional dialogue in any real sense.
Ill
In the final analysis, neither section 1 nor 33 has inhibited the expansion of judicial power under 
the Charter. That this has occurred is hardly surprising: constitutionally entrenched bills of rights 
inevitably shift power to final courts of appeal. Although it is useful and important to debate the 
normative implications of this shift in power, its legitimacy or illegitimacy is somewhat beside 
the point. Greater and more active use of judicial power under the Charter simply is. It is much 
better to recognize the inherently political nature of rights-based adjudication, which is about
27 Andrew Heard, Canadian Constitutional Conventions: The Marriage of Law and Politics (Toronto: Oxford 
University Press, 1991) at 147.
redistributing power among society-based actors and between different components of the state. 
Mobilizing judicial power through constitutional litigation is simply an alternative means of 
achieving of preferred policy outputs. Although the desire of Canadians, frustrated by perceived 
bureaucratic and legislative inaction, to seek policy solutions from the courts is understandable, 
the benefits and costs of this path to change merit closer attention.
The obvious benefit is that courts can order governments to act more quickly and 
forcefully than can citizens. Yet litigation is not without disadvantages. First, the articulation of 
policy demands in the form of constitutional rights can exclude alternative policy choices from 
consideration. Second, the adversarial nature of litigation is best-suited to resolving concrete 
disputes between two parties by imposing retrospective remedies. Complex policy issues—like 
health care, to cite perhaps the “hottest” new Charter issue—involve multiple stakeholders, 
constantly changing facts and evidence, and predictive assessments of the future impact of 
decisions. Finally, rights-based litigation, particularly at the Supreme Court level, by definition 
imposes national solutions on inherently local problems. These solutions can ignore differences 
among provinces and suppress the provincial experimentation necessary to find innovative 
approaches to policy problems.
The purpose of criticizing judicial power under the Charter is not to deny its legitimate 
existence, but to question its exclusive authority to define constitutional rights and the policy 
consequences that flow from those rights. As Mark Tushnet has written, the “misplaced 
allocation of sole constitutional responsibility to the courts” distorts policy and debilitates 
democracy.28 Contrary to some arguments, the Canadian model of rights entrenchment has not 
resolved this paradox.
28 Mark Tushnet, “Policy Distortion and Democratic Debilitation: Comparative Illumination o f the 
Countermajoritarian Difficulty,” (1995) 94 Mich. L. Rev. 245 at 261, n. 60.
